HILLWOODS ACADEMY
MUN Society

Background Guide: Intra MUN Class(IX-XI)

Note: Before reading this, kindly refer to documents related to researching, lobbying and Rules of Procedures uploaded on the Hillwoods MUN Society website.

HISTORY OF MAJOR EXTREMIST GROUPS FUNCTIONAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As well-publicized bouts of violence, from civil war to suicide bombings, plague the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, concern about Islamic extremism is high among countries with substantial Muslim populations, according to a new survey by the Pew Research Center. And in the Middle East, concern is growing. Lebanese, Tunisians, Egyptians, Jordanians and Turks are all more worried about the extremist threat than they were a year ago.

Meanwhile, publics hold very negative opinions of well-known extremist groups, such as al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah.

In Nigeria, the vast majority of respondents, both Muslims and Christians alike, have an unfavorable view of Boko Haram, the terrorist group that recently kidnapped hundreds of girls in the restive north of the country. And a majority of Pakistanis have an unfavorable view of the Taliban.

Few Muslims in most of the countries surveyed say that suicide bombing can often or sometimes be justified against civilian targets in order to defend Islam from its enemies. And support for the tactic has fallen in many countries over the last decade. Still, in some countries a substantial minority says that suicide bombing can be justified.

These are the main findings of a new Pew Research Center survey conducted among 14,244 respondents in 14 countries with significant Muslim populations from April 10 to May 25, 2014. The survey was conducted prior to the recent takeover of Mosul and other areas of Iraq by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

AL- QAEDA in the Middle East:

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed in January 2009 by a merger between two regional offshoots of the international jihadist network in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Since then, it has become what US officials have described as "the most active operational franchise" of al-Qaeda beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan. The group has vowed to target oil facilities, foreigners and security forces as it seeks to topple the Saudi and Yemeni governments, and establish an Islamic caliphate.

It has claimed responsibility for a large number of attacks in the two countries, in which hundreds of people have been killed, as well as a series of sophisticated airline bomb plots targeting the US that were narrowly foiled. AQAP has also capitalised on the instability in Yemen in recent years to establish strongholds in the country's south and east, sometimes taking control of entire towns and villages. But the group has also suffered setbacks, mostly as a result of a US drone campaign that has seen more than 100 air strikes targeting its operatives in the past six years. In June 2015, AQAP announced that its leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi - who was believed to also have been al-Qaeda's overall second-in-command - had been killed in an air raid. While the group was quick to replace Wuhayshi with the experienced military and operations chief, Qasim al-Raymi, analysts said his death was a significant blow. In March 2014, Wuhayshi was filmed telling a outdoor gathering of dozens of militants that al-Qaeda would fight Western "Crusaders" and their allies everywhere, pledging to "remove the cross, the bearer of the cross, America".

That December, the group threatened to kill an American journalist it was holding hostage, Luke Somers, if its unspecified demands were not met within three days. As the deadline approached, Somers was killed along with another hostage, South African teacher Pierre Korkie, during a failed rescue attempt by US special forces. In January 2015, AQAP claimed to be behind a deadly attack

on the Paris offices of the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, which had published caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. Officials confirmed that one of the gunmen had received training at an AQAP camp. AQAP also refused to pledge allegiance to the leader of the rival jihadist group, Islamic State, after it proclaimed the creation of caliphate in the territory under its control in Syria and Iraq, bucking the trend among other al-Qaeda affiliates.

In Yemen, AQAP capitalized on the chaos caused by a rebellion by the Houthi movement and a Saudi-led air campaign to weaken the Zaidi Shia group, expanding the territory it controlled in the south and east of the country.

However, the US drone strikes targeting AQAP did not stop and one was reported to have killed Wuhayshi as he met two fellow militants in Mukalla on 9 June.

On 16 June, AQAP official Khaled Batarfi confirmed Wuhayshi's death in a video statement and vowed that "the blood of these pioneers makes us more determined to sacrifice". Batarfi also said Raymi had been elected by the group's leadership council to succeed Wuhayshi.

ISIS in the Middle East:

Islamic State stands with al-Qaeda as one of the most dangerous jihadist groups, after its gains in Syria and Iraq. Under its former name Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis), it was formed in April 2013, growing out of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

It has since been disavowed by al-Qaeda, but has become one of the main jihadist groups fighting government forces in Syria and Iraq.

Its precise size is unclear but it is thought to include thousands of fighters, including many foreign jihadists.

The organisation is led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Little is known about him, but it is believed he was born in Samarra, north of Baghdad, in 1971 and joined the insurgency that erupted in Iraq soon after the 2003 US-led invasion. In 2010 he emerged as the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, one of the groups that later became

Isis. Baghdadi is regarded as a battlefield commander and tactician, which analysts say makes his group more attractive to young jihadists than al-Qaeda, which is led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Islamic theologian.

Prof Peter Neumann of King's College London estimates that about 80% of Western fighters in Syria have joined the group. IS claims to have fighters from the UK, France, Germany and other European countries, as well as the US, the Arab world and the Caucasus. Unlike other rebel groups in Syria, IS is seen to be working towards an Islamic emirate that straddles Syria and Iraq. The group has seen considerable military success. In March 2013, it took over the Syrian city of Raqqa - the first provincial capital to fall under rebel control. In January 2014, it capitalized on growing tension between Iraq's Sunni minority and Shia-led government by taking control of the predominantly Sunni city of Fallujah, in the western province of Anbar.

It also seized large sections of the provincial capital, Ramadi, and has a presence in a number of towns near the Turkish and Syrian borders. The group has gained a reputation for brutal rule in the areas that it controls. However, it was its conquest of Mosul in June that sent shockwaves around the world.

FUNDING, BORDER SECURITY AND EXPANSION METHODOLOGIES
FUNDING

Twelve months ago, the group now known as Islamic State (IS) was little recognized on the international stage beyond those inspired to travel and join the group as fighters or those in the security and academic worlds monitoring developments in Syria and Iraq. Even at its emergence, it was dismissed as just another of the multitude taking advantage of the chaos created in Syria by the wide-ranging conflict with President Bashar al-Assad. In January 2014, US President Barack Obama downplayed the capabilities and threats posed by those flying the al-Qaeda flag in Falluja and elsewhere across Iraq and Syria. But within a few months, IS controlled a vast and valuable swathe of territory across northern Syria and Iraq. Former US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel

described IS as being as "sophisticated and well-funded as any group that we have seen". "They're beyond just a terrorist group… they are tremendously well funded," he said. More than with any other militant group perhaps, the focus of the international community's attention is on the finances of IS - the revenue it earns from oil, taxation, extortion and looting. The importance of financing in conflict is as old as conflict itself. The Roman orator Marcus Tullius Cicero observed that "the sinews of war [are] a limitless supply of money." More recently, during the Cold War, states sponsored political violence by funding and supporting proxies. However, the end of the Cold War, and the use of UN Security Council resolutions against countries such as Libya and Sudan, saw a dramatic decline in state-sponsored terrorism.

Whilst organizations such as Hezbollah continue to operate with state backing, post-Cold War terrorist organizations have mostly been unable to rely on state sponsorship, thus needing to source their own financing. Skillful financial management is at the heart of the success of any terrorist or insurgent organization - it represents their lifeblood but is also one of their most significant vulnerabilities.

DONORS: Securing and maintaining reliable funding is the key to moving from fringe radical group to recognized terrorist organization - from a hand-to-mouth existence to a more planned and organized model. Successful groups are often defined as much by their skills as financial managers as they are by their military expertise and ability to recruit fighters.

In general, terrorist groups can draw on financing from two primary sources

• Internally, funds are generated by taxation of people, businesses and transport routes; proceeds from kidnap and ransom; and profits from trade

• External funding is provided by donors sympathetic to the cause, be they wealthy supporters (often from Gulf state countries, sometimes referred to as the "Golden Chain") or members of the diaspora community

Donations are also sometimes transferred between like-minded terrorist groups. For example, the Nigerian group Boko Haram reportedly received $250,000 from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2012.

DRUGS:
Al-Shabab in Somalia is a good case in point. Whilst the group receives some limited funding from external sources, it has developed a highly effective charcoal export business which generates up to $80m a year, according to the UN7. Al-Shabab has also mastered another funding tool - business, personal and transport tax. Like IS, al-Shabab controls territory and population, operating a form of quasi-government in the areas under its control - raising taxes and offering some services, particularly security and justice, in return.

IS promises services and food supplies to Muslims in areas it controls. The control of territory also allows lucrative businesses, such as the growing of opium poppies in Afghanistan, to flourish. Over $7bn has been spent on fighting the drugs trade in the country yet despite 13 years of a NATO-led effort, poppy cultivation is at an all-time high, with the Taliban exploiting Afghanistan's position as the supplier of over 90% of global opium output to earn up to $150m a year.

Based in the vast, sparsely inhabited regions across the Sahara and Sahel, AQIM raises its funding from two main sources - Abduction of foreign tourists and workers for ransom in a trade which is believed to have earned the group close to $100m over five years - Control over smuggling routes for drugs which are flown in from Latin America along "Highway 10" - referring to the 10th parallel - as the most direct route across the Atlantic en route to Europe

The Haqqani Network, based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, also relies on smuggling as a key source of finance. With its roots in the opposition to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it controls long-

CASE STUDIES:

CASE OF INEFFICACIOUS SECURITY FORCE- IRAQ
After many years of US-funded training and development of Iraqi security personnel, the efficacy of Iraqi security forces is still dangerously lacking. It is reported that Iraqis do not feel protected by the statutory security sector and turn towards local or sectarian non-statutory security providers for protection. Religious militias, neighbourhood watches, and tribal insurgent groups have filled the vacuum left by an incapable and sometimes reluctant statutory security sector. Lack of a unified front has made border operations for ISIS relatively easier to conduct. This has also put countries situated near Iraq at a high risk of infiltration.

EXPANSION TOWARDS EUROPE, A CASE OF POROUS BORDERS- TURKEY
Western nations, including Turkey's NATO allies, have expressed grave concern over the risk of ISIS infiltrating Europe through Turkey. Turkey's border with Syria is a 550 mile rugged terrain, dotted with assorted urban centres where fighters can blend into the population. Since the start of the civil war in Syria in 2011, scores of young men from across Europe have reportedly slipped into Syria through the country. With this, a continent that has had relatively less to tackle with on the terrorism front in the past stands exposed to the risk of extreme territorial jihadism.

INTERPOL AND EU COLLABORATE TO ENHANCE BORDER SECURITY- LIBYA
http://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/News/2013/N20130307/
http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/wg_bordermgmt.shtml
A discussion in the committee regarding the efficacy of such methods and the possibility of such collaborations for the purpose of strengthening borders in

the Middle-east and deterring "travel-terrorism" would be appreciated.

INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES
1. Working Group on Border Management Relating to Counter- Terrorism was established to help Member States strengthen their border-management and border-control systems as set out in Pillar II, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 13 to 16 and Pillar III, paragraphs 2, 4 and 11 to 13 of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)10.
2. A directory of international good practices, codes and standards relevant to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) addresses a number of issues that are of increasing concern to the international community, such as prohibition of incitement to commit terrorist acts, extremism, and radicalization leading to violence, and was prepared in response to the desire of the Council that the Committee and CTED focus increased attention on resolution 1624 (2005) in their dialogue with Member States. The new directory covers a broad range of international good practices, codes and standards dealing with issues such as criminalization of incitement, border control, safe haven, passenger security, dialogue among civilizations, prevention of acts of terrorism motivated by intolerance and extremism and prevention, and the subversion of educational, cultural and religious institutions by terrorists.
3. SC resolution 2174(2014) was adopted last September and deals elaborately with the above mentioned issues.11

ROLE OF EXTREMIST GROUPS OUTSIDE MIDDLE-EAST
ISIS, with its elaborate funding and management, has changed the way that terrorist organisations strive to function. Naturally, it has gained both supporters and enemies in the form of other terrorist cells for this very reason. Back in March 2015, Boko Haram pledged its support to the ISIS. With its stated aim of creating an Islamic caliphate can spread its roots to Nigeria and

other places in Africa with the help of Boko Haram. Last year, a former faction of the Pakistani Taliban called Tehreek-e-Khilafat also pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State. Among the other terrorist networks operating in middle-east, Al-Qaeda, for instance, works in collaboration with Pakistani Taliban. These networks themselves working outside the middle-eastern region still influence the political dynamics of the region by alternatively supporting any one of the major terrorist networks working in the region. While networks like ISIS do not need funding help from these organisations, their support mainly reflects the ease with which ISIS, Al-Qaeda and others can spread their propaganda in other regions.

TRAVEL TERRORISM
ISIS manages to attract some response from every target region. Youth from different countries, influenced by the ideology of terrorist networks such as ISIS, travel to the Middle-east and are given training there. These people are then sent back to their countries to spread the 'message of Islam' there and develop local cells. This process is sometimes called 'travel terrorism'.

SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS
As mentioned in an earlier section, ISIS uses the ideological support of terrorist cells in other regions to carry on their recruitment activities for them.

OVERTAKING LOCAL CELLS
Many local level terrorist cells with their recruits and funds have been submerged within ISIS in the past.

INFILTRATION OF BORDERS
ISIS has been trying to infiltrate the borders of countries neighboring Iraq and Syria and spreading their propaganda there.

NATURE OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE

Documents from the following sources will be considered as credible proof for any allegations made in committee or statements that require verification:

☐ Reuters: Appropriate Documents and articles from the Reuters News agency will be used to corroborate or refute controversial statements made in committee.

☐ UN Document: Documents by all UN agencies will be considered as sufficient proof. Reports from all UN bodies including treaty based bodies will also be accepted.

☐ Government Reports: Government Reports of a given country used to corroborate an allegation on the same aforementioned country will be accepted as proof.

TOPICS TO RESEARCH UPON:

1) Asylum Seekers fleeing the war, Refugee crises in Europe and elsewhere.

2) Political Instability in countries affected by war, and its implications on other countries.

3) Terrorist groups emerging in Middle-East region.